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Abstract 
The importance of security in the development of complex 
software systems has increasingly become more critical 
as software becomes increasingly more pervasive in our 
everyday lives.  Aspect-orientation has been proposed as 
a means to handle the crosscutting nature of security 
requirements when developing, designing and 
implementing security-critical applications.  This paper 
surveys some of the approaches and contributions of 
integrating an aspect-oriented approach into designing 
and implementing secure software systems.          
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1. Introduction 
The importance of security in the development of complex 
software systems has increasingly become more critical as 
software becomes increasingly more pervasive in our 
everyday lives [4].  A wide range of security-critical 
domains (e.g., finance, national defense, etc.) rely on 
software applications as the major enforcement entity 
ensuring the security policies of the stakeholders.  
Although secure systems are critical to numerous domains, 
industry experience has shown that software developers 
are poor at writing secure code, often because of the 
complex nature of non-functional requirements such as 
security [17].        
 It is well established that security requirements are 
non-functional requirements that are cross-cutting in 
nature [7] - they "crosscut the requirements, design or 
implementation of several or even many building blocks" 
[11].  This further complicates producing secure code 
since the enforcement of security policies are scattered or 
"tangled" throughout the design and implementation.  An 
important solution in managing the crosscutting nature of 
security requirements is to adopt an aspect-oriented 
software development (AOSD) approach in designing and 
implementing the system [8].  AOSD handles crosscutting 
concerns, such as security, by employing the separation of 
concerns view.  In terms of security, this means that the 
  
main module(s) of a program would not need to encode 
security policies; rather, security policies would be 
separated and implemented in a separate, independent 
piece of code [17].  Using AOSD, the separation of 
concerns principle for a crosscutting concern, can be 
applied from the requirements engineering phase (e.g., 
[12]) through the software lifecycle until it is (likely) 
implemented as an aspect in aspect-oriented programming 
(AOP), for example in AspectJ [9], in the software.     
 In analyzing the deficiencies of the state of the art in 
designing, developing and implementing secure systems, 
Viega, Bloch and Chandra identified a number of 
desirable properties in any solution hoping to improve 
software engineers and developers in producing more 
secure systems.  The properties in [17] include: 
 
• The security-related properties in a system should be 
abstracted out of the main system to improve clarity, 
maintainability, manageability and reuse. 
• Legacy source code with known or potential security 
vulnerabilities should be able to be patched with a 
minimal amount of new code.  It should also be 
possible to avoid modifying the original code. 
• When applicable, security-related properties should 
be reusable across different applications.   
 
AOSD and AOP proponents claim that their techniques, 
frameworks and methodologies satisfy these properties 
when implementing security requirements as crosscutting 
concerns [17].  In addition, AOSD and AOP specifically 
can aid in the following security-specific activities [17]: 
 
• Automatically perform error checking on security-
sensitive calls. 
• Automatically log data related to security concerns. 
• Replace generic code with secure code (e.g., generic 
socket code with SSL socket code). 
• Insert code at startup that goes through a set of 
"lockdown" procedures. 
• Specify privileged sections a program and 
automatically request and return privileges when 
necessary.  
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 Thus, the contributions of adopting an AOSD/AOP 
approach to designing and implementing the security 
requirements of a security-critical software system have 
led researchers to actively pursue this avenue as a viable 
approach.  This paper surveys some of the contributions 
and their relation to designing and implementing secure 
software systems.  Specifically, this paper investigates 
several differing aspect-oriented security frameworks 
proposed in literature, identifies problems and lessons 
learned from the proposed aspect-oriented security 
frameworks and discusses and briefly evaluates the 
AOSD-based security frameworks.  The second part of 
this work provides a broad review of aspect-oriented 
approaches used for secure coding, modeling security 
concerns and resolving security concerns in distributed 
software applications.         
  
2.  Aspects in Software Security: Security 
Frameworks Employing an Aspect-Oriented 
Approach 
This section investigates several approaches for using an 
aspect-oriented framework for designing secure software 
systems.  We first review UML-based security framework 
for incorporating security policies as an aspect when 
designing a secure system.  We then review a rather 
formal, architecture-based, aspect-oriented security 
framework that heavily uses the Software Architecture 
Model (SAM), Petri nets and temporal logic for 
architecting a secure software system.  Third, we review a 
generic aspect-oriented security framework and provide 
the authors' learned lessons derived from its design and 
use.  It is hoped that the lessons learned contribute to the 
improved design of future security frameworks.  We 
conclude this section with some discussion and an 
informal evaluation of the AOSD-based security 
frameworks. 
 
2.1  Designing a Secure System Using Aspects 
It has been well established that the manner in which 
software is designed can have a significant impact on 
nonfunctional qualities of the system (e.g., reliability, 
usability, security, etc.).  Therefore, it is crucial that 
software engineers and developers consider these 
nonfunctional concerns when making architectural, logical 
and physical design decisions.  This subsection briefly 
covers an aspect-oriented design technique for designing a 
secure system as proposed Georg, Ray and France in [6].  
In [6], security concerns are captured in aspects and are 
treated as design patterns.  The authors claim that viewing 
security concerns in this manner during design modeling 
allows for the following advantages [6]: 
• Aspects allow one to understand and communicate 
security concerns in their essential forms, rather than 
in terms of specific behavior. 
• An aspect focuses on one concern, allowing for an 
easier way to model and understand its behavior.   
• Security aspects may be reusable across different 
systems. 
• Changes to security policies are made in one place 
(the implemented security aspect) and effected by 
weaving the aspects into the primary model. 
• Easier to analyze the impact of security concerns on 
design units by weaving the aspects into the primary 
models and evaluating the resulting models.   
• Security engineers and designers may be able to 
identify problems with the design of the security 
mechanisms even before they are implemented - 
potentially saving significant development cost, time 
and effort.   
 
 This approach uses Role Models, "a structure of roles 
where a (meta-)role defines properties that must be 
satisfied by conforming to a UML model elements" (e.g., 
a class or an association) [6].  Then, weaving this kind of 
an aspect into a primary model only involves a model 
transformation process where the non-conforming model 
is transformed to a conforming model (i.e., the model that 
incorporates the aspect). 
 A security concern as a design aspect is modeled using 
two aspect views: static and interaction views.  The static 
view captures the structural properties of the aspect.  The 
interaction view captures the interaction patterns 
associated with the aspect.  This approach uses Static Role 
Models (SRM) and Interaction Role Models (IRM) to 
model these two views.  An SRM defines the patterns of 
UML static structural model, such as UML Class Diagram 
patters, and an IRM defines UML interaction diagram 
patters, such as UML Collaboration Diagram patterns.  
Using this models, an aspect definition usually consists of 
an SRM and one or more IRMs.  A full description of 
SRMs and IRMs can be found in [6] and other existing 
literature.  
 The authors of [6] then define security objectives 
including confidentiality, integrity and availability and 
provide a know list of potential security attacks, problems 
and solutions.  They claim weaving strategies, to 
determine the constraints and the manner in which the 
aspects (containing the security policies), need to be 
developed from the expected security threats and 
problems expected for the proposed system.  For example, 
if the proposed system has non-sensitive data traveling 
over communication links, this indicates that encryption is 
not need and can be omitted from the weaving strategies.  
However, [6] provides no insight on how to choose a 
strategy for different security attacks and problems and 
provides no listing or evaluation of weaving strategies for 
different weaving strategies.  Presumably, this is at the 
discretion and expertise of the security engineer.  Rather, 
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[6] focuses on how to model security aspects using Role 
Models and then how to weave the aspects into a design 
model.  
 To weave an aspect modeled by a combination of an 
SRM and IRM(s), the following steps suffice: 
 
1. Map primary model elements to the roles they 
intend to play. 
2. Merge roles with primary model elements. 
3. Add new elements to the primary model. 
4. Delete existing elements from the primary model. 
            
 The authors intend that the weaving strategies become 
"reusable forms of experience that can be used to assess 
the threats to a particular system and propose techniques 
(i.e., a combination of mechanisms) to prevent or detect 
related attacks" [6].  Yet, they provide no demonstration 
or hint how this can be done.  Further, the authors claim 
that their approach provides the ability to easily change 
the weaving strategy and then re-weave them into the 
model to observe the impact on the system by the 
proposed changes.  This could be quite powerful if a 
security engineer is intuitive enough to see the advantages 
and disadvantages in the application of different weaving 
strategies.  However, this analysis would only be as good 
as the engineer. 
 This approach is somewhat problematic in that the 
security provided by the mechanisms in the model is only 
as good as the weaving strategies.  That is, a good security 
policy may be implemented in the aspects, but a poor 
weaving strategy of the aspect into the primary module 
will yield an insecure system.  Coupling this with the lack 
of guidance, or even several realistic examples, provided 
by the authors in selecting an appropriate weaving 
strategy for a particular security attack or problem 
illustrates the immaturity of this approach.  Further, the 
lack of tool support prevents the practical use of this 
approach and an empirical evaluation using this approach 
hinders its independent evaluation.         
 
2.2  Secure Software Architectures Using 
Aspect Orientation   
While the security framework using aspect-orientation 
described in [6] uses the UML-like models along with 
Role Models to define a system and an aspect, the 
approach presented in [18] relies on the more formal 
methods of the Software Architecture Model (SAM), Petri 
nets and temporal logic to define the system and the 
security aspects.  This approach uses SAM to define a 
hierarchical set of compositions of the software 
architecture where each composition consists of a set of 
components, a set of connectors and a set of constraints to 
be satisfied by the interacting components.  The behavior 
of the components and connectors are modeled by 
predicate transition nets and the properties are specified 
my temporal logic formulas.  This subsection describes 
the formal approach, described in [18], to design secure 
software architectures.  The secure architecture derived 
from this approach "defines the structure of the software 
system, the interaction and coordination among its 
components, which correctly enforces the security 
requirement" [18].  The authors claim the following 
contributions of their approach: 
 
•  A formal notion for aspect-oriented modeling at an 
architectural level. 
• An aspect-oriented approach to designing secure 
software architectures. 
 
 
Figure 1. An AOSD Framework for Secure Software 
Architectures 
 
 An overview of the approach in [18] is given in Figure 
1.  The following provides a quick summary for each step 
in the framework illustrated in Figure 1:   
 
• The problem domain model gives a precise 
description of the basic functionality and their 
relationship to the proposed system. 
• The base architecture model defines the software 
architecture for the basic functional modules and 
their connections.   
• The security aspect model describes the security 
requirements, defines the vulnerabilities and threats 
and provides mechanisms that enforce security 
policies into the software architecture. 
• The secure architecture model is the software 
architecture model that the security polices have 
been correctly enforced.   
 
 The base architecture model in this approach is a 
SAM model with block grouping (a block is a part or 
whole of a predicate transition net that models a particular 
software module and is characterized by its internal 
elements and its external elements).  Each block 
represents an autonomous software entity.  
 The security aspect model describe precisely the 
security relevant features of the proposed software system.  
This approach uses two language constructs to specify 
security aspects of software architectures.  They are: 
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• Architecture constructs that define characteristics of 
the block-based architecture and also include 
attributes such as name, main task, sensitive 
information, etc.   
• Security constructs that specify security policies and 
include LTL-like constructs for the problem domain.   
 
Using these constructs, [18] defines how the security 
aspect applies to the base architecture model by using 
join points, pointcuts, and aspects.  They define a pointcut 
as connectors that have the same security vulnerability and 
share the common security enforcement mechanism.  An 
advice is a pattern that “specify the security enforcement 
mechanisms for pointcuts” [18].  Additionally, advice 
associates fragments of predicate transition nets with 
pointcuts, “which specify the system behaviors at every 
join points in particular join points” [18].   
 The aspect weaving step in this framework creates a 
software architecture by weaving aspect models with the 
base architecture model using the following steps: 
 
1. Locating the join points - Pinpointing the location 
where the base architecture model and the aspect 
models (i.e., the security requirements) interact. 
a. Analyze security vulnerabilities and threats to 
the software based on the security requirements. 
b. Specify join point conditions for the connectors 
in the base architecture model.  This typically 
shows what security vulnerability that the 
connectors in the base model are vulnerable to. 
c. Check each connector in the base model to see 
if it meets the join point condition.   
2. Constructing advices - Defining the behavior of the 
system in order to enforce security policies on the 
base software architecture. 
a. Identify join points that have the same 
vulnerability and group them together as a 
pointcut. 
b. Design a mechanism or an advice for each 
pointcut such that the vulnerability is mitigated. 
3. Weaving aspects - Integrating the aspect models (i.e., 
security requirements) into the base software 
architecture. 
a. Arrange a systematic way to search for 
joinpoints. 
b. For each joinpont, modify the base architecture 
model according to the corresponding advice. 
 
 The authors claim that this approach offers a rigorous 
way to identify notion in aspect-orientation and to reason 
about the correctness of aspect weaving (not described 
here).  Additionally, they claim that the join point model 
in their security framework has a powerful expressibility 
because of the hierarchical modeling ability of the 
software architecture, due to their use of SAM.  Lastly, the 
authors claim that their approach supports a reusable and 
reliable design of secure software architectures.   
 In light of their claims, this paper only present 
preliminary results of applying their security framework 
using a formal aspect-oriented approach to build secure 
software architectures of a toy problem (a travel planner 
information system).  This approach lacks any tool 
support and fails to address the scalability of their 
approach as the proposed system and security 
requirements gets larger.  Lastly, the authors do not 
discuss the dependency between the aspect models and 
how to correctly partition of security aspects.  Compared 
to the previous security framework, discussed in Section 
2.1, however, this approach offers a more formal and 
structured process and is far more advanced and mature as 
a process in incorporating an AOSD approach in the 
design, development and implementation of security 
requirements.   
 
2.3  An Aspect-Oriented Security Framework  
The aspect-oriented security framework proposed in [14] 
is clearly not as developed as [6] in Section 2.1 and [18] 
in Section 2.2 but is aimed at creating a truly generic 
aspect-oriented framework that any specialized security 
framework should adhere to.  That is, the approach 
proposed in [14] concentrates on defining the 
characteristics that any good AOSD security approach 
should contain and then how this might be achieved.  In 
this section, we describe the generalized conclusions of 
this work in Section 2.3.1 and then the authors lessons 
learned from the development and implementation of an 
aspect-oriented security framework.  This work, although 
not comparable to the previous approaches in its maturity, 
structure or applicability, is presented here to generalize 
the needed characteristics and encountered short-comings 
of an aspect-oriented security framework so that future 
proposed frameworks include what has been shown to be 
needed and avoid previous pitfalls.     
 
2.3.1 An Aspect-Oriented Security Framework 
 The framework described in [14] identified the 
following primary characteristics needed in a security 
framework: 
 
• Proactive stance. A security framework should be 
designed to be used as part of the development 
process so that security can be applied to the 
software system by default. 
• Global application.  A security framework should 
treat security as a crosscutting concern but also 
allow security analysts to apply security solutions 
globally while still giving them the flexibility to 
focus on only pieces of the system if necessary. 
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• Consistent implementation.  A security framework 
should apply implementations consistently of the 
same solution.  This should be achieved by 
automating the process of integrating the security 
solutions into the software system.   
• Adaptability.  A security framework should provide 
a full-featured “transformation engine and 
expressive but simple language for encoding generic 
directives for security solutions” [14].  It should 
ensure that the security framework can be used to 
implement a wide range of security solutions.     
• Seamless integration.  Any security framework or 
security framework tool should be easily integrated 
into the build process of a software system.   
 
The authors claim that these features needed in a security 
framework “meld well with the strengths of the aspect-
oriented program model” [14].  Surprisingly, however, the 
authors in [14] do not mention reusability of security 
policies as a desirable characteristic even though the 
security frameworks [6], described in Section 2.1, and 
[18], described in Section 2.2, mention it as a contribution 
characteristic of their aspect-oriented security framework.   
 Using these characteristics, the authors implemented 
a framework and tool target to address several common, 
implementation security problems in C programs.  
Specifically, the authors applied their security framework 
to address such prevalent security exploits as [14]: 
 
• Buffer overruns 
• Time-of-check-to-time-of-use 
• Format string vulnerabilities 
• Protection of communication channels 
• Event ordering enforcement 
• Type safety 
 
 The authors conclude, while their approach was 
helpful, an approach that implemented security policies at 
the design or architecture phases are more apt to consider 
globally applicable security threats or vulnerabilities.  
Unfortunately, few details of their approach don't allow 
for an adequate understanding of how to apply their 
security framework to other applications, much less to 
allow the ability to independently evaluate their approach.     
 
2.3.2 Lessons Learned from An Aspect-Oriented 
Security Framework 
Despite the lack of details provided for the aspect-oriented 
security framework [14] described in Section 2.3.1, the 
authors provide some lessons learned/obstacles 
encountered in [15].  These obstacles were derived from 
developing their security framework and then having 
developers apply it to an application in practice.  The 
authors intend these lessons learned to be used by other 
practitioners when developing improved aspect-oriented 
security frameworks. 
 From [15], the lessons learned include: 
 
1. The KISS Principle.  The adoption by software 
developers and QA teams of a new software 
development approach or language into industry use 
typically requires an easy to understand, well-
documented technique.  This is particularly true for 
AOSD-based approaches since "aspects tend to 
invalidate the concept of well-defined, narrow 
interfaces" thus adding to the complexity of the 
software [15].    
2. Shifting Development Paradigms.  To get software 
professionals and the software industry to adopt a 
new software development paradigm demands case 
studies, empirical analysis and results to prove the 
advantages of adopting a new way of designing and 
developing software.   
3. Traceability.  It is necessary to have a security 
framework to have a mechanism to allow for 
traceability that a development team to maintain 
throughout the software development lifecycle.  The 
framework in [15] did not have the ability for tracing 
security requirements throughout the development 
lifecyle, and this was the main complaint by the 
developers and QA teams when applying this 
security framework in practice.   
4. Early lifecycle security abstractions.  The 
approach in [15] allowed developers to separate 
security concerns from the program's main modules 
during the implementation phase rather than in the 
earlier development phases (requirements, design, 
etc.).  The developers indicated that the ability to 
define code level security concerns during the design 
phase is critical to properly integrating security 
requirements in an AOSD-based security framework. 
5. Tool support.  As in any software engineering 
approach, the lack of tool support hindered the 
practicality, understanding, effectiveness and 
accuracy of using the AOSD-based security 
framework of [15] by developers in practice.   
 
 Although the lessons learned, listed above, may seem 
obvious to most software engineers, it is important to 
describe them since they came from comments made by 
actual software developers using the AOSD-based 
security framework of [14] in practice.  Further, the 
lessons learned come from the mistakes made in [14] and 
thus should (hopefully) not be repeated in later AOSD-
based security frameworks so that the AOSD and security 
community can quickly arrive at a practical, effective 
AOSD-based security framework that can be readily used 
in practice.   
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2.4  Aspect-Oriented Security Frameworks 
Discussion and Evaluation 
Using the five lessons learned of [15] as an evaluation 
criteria for the AOSD-based frameworks [6], described in 
Section 2.1, and [18], described in Section 2.2 we see that 
these security frameworks make several of the same 
mistakes as [14] despite being published several years 
later.   
 The AOSD-based security framework in [6], we 
provide the following evaluation using the lessons learned 
of [15] as an evaluation metric: 
 
• The KISS Principle.  The use of UML and a UML-
like way of defining security concerns is something 
that most software developers are familiar with 
allowing for a quick understanding of the framework.  
The description of the process, however, is not 
enough that it likely could not be successfully 
applied in practice.    
• Shifting Development Paradigms.  Again, since a 
UML-like language was used, software designers 
and developers may not be forced to make a large 
shift in their development paradigm to be able to 
incorporate security concerns as an aspect of their 
design and implementation. 
• Traceability.  The approach provides no mention or 
mechanism at how traceability could be achieved.  
However, we believe that the way in which they 
model a security concern (as a UML Collaboration 
Diagram), it may not be difficult to manually verify 
and trace a security requirement throughout the 
development lifecycle.     
• Early lifecycle security abstractions.  The 
framework is aimed at the design phase of a 
security-critical software application.  Thus, it 
allows for early lifecycle security abstractions. 
• Tool support.  Does not provide any tool support 
although it was mentioned as future work.  Note 
however, a current search could not find tool support 
for this security framework.      
 
The AOSD-based security framework in [18], we provide 
the following evaluation using the lessons learned of [15] 
as an evaluation metric: 
 
• The KISS Principle.  The use of the Software 
Architecture Model (SAM), Petri nets and temporal 
logic in the definition of the software architecture 
and security concerns may be intimidating and 
difficult for those in industry that currently do not 
use such an approach.  Yet, since [18] was looking 
to develop a more formal AOSD-based security 
framework, adhering to this principle may be 
difficult.    
• Shifting Development Paradigms.  Again, to ask 
industry to adopt the use of SAM, Petri nets and 
temporal logic in their development process when it 
is not currently used is a lot to ask without proven, 
empirical results showing the advantages of this 
framework. 
• Traceability.  Like [6], [18] provides no explicit 
support for traceability of security concerns from 
design to architecture to implementation.  However, 
unlike [6], [18]'s heavy formalisms would 
complicate a manual trace of a security requirement 
throughout the development lifecycle.      
• Early lifecycle security abstractions.  The 
framework is aimed at the architecture phase of a 
security-critical software application.  Thus, it 
allows for early lifecycle security abstractions, 
however, not as early in the development lifecycle as 
[6]. 
• Tool support.  Does not provide any tool support 
although it was mentioned as future work.  Tool 
support for this security framework is critical 
because of the heavy formalisms and the notation-
intense definitions of a software architecture and 
security concerns.  Again note, a current search 
could not find tool support for this security 
framework. 
 
 Thus, neither AOSD-based security frameworks 
measure up to the standards required by [15].  Although 
the security frameworks of [6] and [18] provide 
innovative approaches, it is clear that they need to be 
further developed and integrated into the development 
lifecycle and better supported with tools and empirical 
results before they are used in a software industry setting. 
 
3.  Aspects in Software Security: Other 
Approaches in Using an Aspect-Oriented for 
Software Security 
This section investigates beyond proposed security 
frameworks employing an aspect-oriented approach.  
Research in adopting an aspect-oriented approach in 
securing coding, AOP modeling and verification of access 
control and distributed aspects remain active research 
interests in regards to software application security.  This 
section specifically addresses the active research pursuits 
in these areas of adapting an aspect-oriented approach to 
developing, designing and implementing the security 
requirements of a security-critical software system.      
 
3.1  Secure Coding 
New programming paradigm promoting separation of 
concern is Aspect-Oriented Programming. Security 
information in the coding can be separated as a concern 
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and can be encoded separately from the base code. The 
popular Object-oriented programming supports such kind 
of modularity to an extent, which doesn’t provides enough 
flexibility and adaptability and just good in separating 
concepts that can be mapped easily to the objects. 
Modeling security in OOP’s is difficult, in the sense that 
we can write a class for security which other objects can 
call this security class for each checking. This incurs 
complete exhaustive spreading of call code through out 
the application code base. 
In the above case, if one forgets a critical checking, 
penetrate and patching process is really exhaustive and 
very expensive. And central security class is difficult to 
recover from the critical check. This leads to the 
separation of the security as a concern in programming 
base. Aspect-oriented programming gives more flexibility 
in addressing this concern and solving it. The paper [17] 
has proposed an AOP extension to the C programming 
language.  This extension gives greater benefit in the 
secure coding. An AOP technique allows an application 
developer to just focus on the application and doesn’t 
need to have any knowledge about the security while 
programming. Later, a security expert can model the 
secure segment and can easily weave it into the 
application base code. 
It is also understandable that developers are not and 
need not be good in writing secure code. One of the 
popular examples is buffer overflow problem, which 
exploits the C code. The possible solution for this kind of 
known security issue is penetrate-and-patch strategy 
through out the base code. The paper also addresses that 
the reasons for such insecure code pattern are no 
comprehensive design time methodologies, lack of 
comprehensive resource tools to help write secure 
programs, lack of expertise with both application and 
security knowledge. Some of the more common problems 
include misuse of security protocols and unrealistic view 
of what a system should consider “trusted”. 
Tools that try to provide security assurance, 
vulnerability analysis help to prevent security 
vulnerabilities, which are after-the-fact tools. They don’t 
address how to design and implement the secure code. 
The main principle of the paper [17] is to give a proactive 
approach by the use of AOP extension to the C language. 
The extension principles are minimizing the security 
knowledge requirement for a developer, abstraction of 
security related elements from the application, increase 
the clarity of the program, language generic security 
policy specification, reducing the effort of developing 
secure application, effectiveness and easy way of 
expressing policies, legacy source code with known 
problems should be able to benefit from this effectively, 
reusability of the security policies across different 
applications.  
The language the paper [17] proposes allows inserting 
the advice code before the point of interest; replace the 
point of interest, after the point of interest. The types of 
locations to operate on are,  
 
1. Calls to functions 
2. Function definitions 
3. Pieces of functions 
 
One of the example for aspects that replaces the 
vulnerable rand() function in C Language, is given below. 
 
aspects secure_random{ 
 
 int secure_rand(void) { 
    /** 
     * Secure call to random defined here 
   **/ 
 } 
 
 funcCall<int rand(void)> { 
    replace { 
       secure_rand(); 
    } 
 } 
} 
 
In the above example, secure_rand(void) is a function 
definition for secure random number generation. The 
keyword ‘funcCall’ specifies that matches call to functions. 
In this case, the calls to rand() is caught and replaced by 
the secure_rand() function. The extension language 
weaves the aspects into the regular C program to single C 
program at the compile time. This extension supports 
three type of matching facilities, namely: 
 
1. Name 
2. Type 
3. Argument 
 
Name matching allows the programmer to give an 
interest in functions, files, modules whose names matches 
a pattern, for which they use the “?” construct to specify 
the wildcards in names. To support the type specification 
they used “any?” or “any*” to specify one type or all type. 
In order to match the variable argument, “…” operator is 
used. 
This paper ignores the problem of order and 
precedence concern that is the order in which the aspects 
are weaved to the base code. It disallows all the conflicts. 
Applying the AOP to security has various usages, namely: 
 
1. automatic error checking on security critical calls 
2. implement buffer overflow protection techniques 
3. automatic logging of security relevant data 
 8 
4. replacing generic socket code with SSL socket 
code 
5. specifying privileged sections in the program to go 
through set of lock-sown procedures 
 
They also mention aspect weaver with suite of security 
aspects is language independent. They have also given the 
example above a complete implementation, and how the 
code looks after woven. So the paper identifies some of 
the major problem in software security and proposes an 
extension for C language to use AOP concept to alleviate 
those security problems. 
 
3.2  AOP Modeling and Verification of 
Access Control 
In the paper [16], they address the inadequate support of 
access control for web applications, and propose how the 
use of AOP techniques solves the problem. They give an 
extension of UML based web engineering (UWE). In the 
web application, implementation of complex business 
processes faces the problem of access control over the 
pages which the user can access. Access control is 
commonly modeled as the part of web navigation in each 
and every element, introducing redundancy into the 
models. Access control is a cross cutting concern in web 
applications, applies to several classes of web pages. 
UWE separates the web application as the content, the 
navigation structure, business process and presentation. 
Based on navigation model of UWE, they use the UML 
state machine to model access control in web applications.  
In web application, if the navigation nodes need to be 
given access control then the link-based access control is 
given in traditional method. But the navigation node can 
be accessed via external link, under which case the link 
based access control fails. Therefore the access control 
should be a part of the behavior of the protected nodes. 
This paper extends the UWE by associating to each 
navigation node one state machine which specifies the 
detailed behavior of the navigation node (Figure 2). This a 
naïve approach. 
 
 
Figure 2. UML Metamodel: Model Element & State Machine 
 
In this basic approach it is very difficult to associate 
same statemachine for multiple model elements. Say, if we 
have same security policy state machine, it introduces 
redundancy for each model element. So they give an 
extension of the UWE metamodel, introducing the 
concept of aspects into UWE. All the classes that is to be 
associated to same rules are put together in a single aspect 
AccessControl. So, similar association is done to this 
aspect and not to each and every classes contained in the 
AccessControl aspect. The access control rules are 
defined in the aspect that contains all the navigation nodes 
of the same access control rules.  Modeling of access 
control in web application is modularized this way, and 
redundant specifications can be avoided.  
 
 
Figure 3. Extension of UWE Metamodel by Aspects 
 
This can also be nested Aspects of Aspects and also 
can be extended to multiple aspects in Aspects. 
An example of web application is a publication library, 
where each node needs to be protected by access control 
rules. This can be modularized by the use of this approach, 
which is shown below. 
 
 
Figure 4. Library Web Application – Navigation Diagram 
 
Figure 5. Aspect AccessControl Containing Concerned Nodes 
 
This paper thus address the access control cross 
cutting concern in a web application, which can be easily 
modularized using the aspect oriented modeling approach. 
Also the paper [16] similarly uses the aspect concept for 
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describing the access control properties of popular RBAC 
model. Also it shows how the verification composition of 
access control features can be supported by the use of 
aspect concept. But the systematic verification model 
doesn’t gives an automatic verification model. The well 
known paper [5] on modeling security concern in an 
aspect based approach, also addresses the above discussed 
issues and describes the strategies to analyze the security 
concern in various functional concern effectively using 
aspect oriented approach. This approach is based on the 
UML templates and UML collaborations. Weaving of the 
aspects with the base model is primarily obtained by 
merging model elements with the same name. 
 
3.3  Distributed Aspects 
The paper [10] discusses the distributed related concerns. 
This paper proposes the notion of remote pointcuts that 
can match events on remote hosts, including the support 
for remote sequences. It also allows distributed advise 
execution. Finally it provides the model of distributed 
aspects which addresses deployment, instantiation and 
data sharing issues. They have extended JAsCo to support 
dynamic aspects. They have explained this concept taking 
the example of data cache and replication problem. They 
proposed this language as AWED which enables the 
matching of the remote join points by the remote pointcuts, 
and all corresponding associated aspects is executed in 
remote hosts. This gives the support for multiple host 
aspect execution and multiple host joint point catching. 
The remote sequence concept allows one to give the order 
of precedence and catch accordingly.  
This paper also allows the advice to give the 
declaration of the concept of Group, where multiple hosts 
can be grouped together for the remote pointcut or aspects 
execution. Also, it allows the synchronous and 
asynchronous remote aspect execution. At the real 
implementation a remote proxy aspect is generated at the 
joint pointcut host and redirecting the catch to the remote 
aspects. This paper addresses and shows how this 
approach helps greatly improving the complete cache 
replication and solving the issues effectively.   
 
3.4  Discussion 
As we have seen in all the papers above the security is a 
concern which prevails in any context. When we take a 
scenario in the context of application, the security concern 
is present across various code segments. It is well known 
crosscutting concern, which can be effectively and 
efficiently handled using the AOP techniques. 
 Also, consider the implementation of a complete 
system in OSI architecture (Fig. 7). There will be various 
layer dependent security issues which runs across layers. 
Security is also a cross layer concern, using AOP we can 
handle more easily  
 
Figure 6. Security - A Crosscutting Concern 
 
 
Figure 7. Cross Layer Security Concern  
 
Similarly, security is not a localized concern. It is a 
distributed concern which is present across the entire 
network globally. It is very difficult and highly expensive 
to implement this kind of concern in a regular 
programming technique. The Aspect Oriented technique 
gives a greater flexibility to address this problem and 
solve this security concern across different machine. As 
proposed by the paper [10], the distributed concerns can 
be solved by the use of aspects effectively, the security 
concern which runs over the machines can be solved very 
effectively in a cost efficient way. 
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4.  Concluding Remarks 
Clearly, assuring stakeholders that a security-critical 
software system correctly satisfies the security properties 
placed upon it will continue to be an important task for 
successful applications.  The crosscutting nature of 
security requirements complicates the design, 
development and implementation of software systems with 
many security requirements (e.g., security requirements 
being tangled in requirements and design documents and 
in the actual implementation, traceability of security 
requirements from requirements and design into actual 
implementation, etc.).  Fortunately, adopting an aspect-
oriented software development (AOSD) approach in 
developing, designing and implementing eases the 
complexities of crosscutting requirements, such as many 
security requirements.  AOSD proposes solutions to better 
modularize crosscutting requirements (i.e., concerns) by 
removing them from the main modules and allotting them 
into a separate module that then applies to certain points 
of execution in the main modules.  This then detangles the 
crosscutting concerns and allows for a more modularized, 
manageable software architecture. 
 This paper described several approaches to 
incorporating an aspect-oriented viewpoint when 
developing, designing and implementing security 
requirements in a software system.  Several AOSD-like 
security frameworks were reviewed as well as other 
approaches using AOSD when handling security concerns.  
The high number of and wide-ranging approaches indicate 
that current state of research in adopting and AOSD 
approach into the implementation of security requirements 
is in its infancy and that no agreement within the AOSD or 
security community has been reached as to which 
approach is most suitable.  Thus, research in this area will 
likely continue until a suitable approach or approaches are 
published and agreed upon by the AOSD and security 
community with enough empirical results to prove that it, 
indeed, provides a superior solution.              
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